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RESEARCH & DEBATE
“GETTING SERIOUS ABOUT STRATEGY IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA” 
WHAT ANALYSIS IS REQUIRED TO COMPEL A NEW U.S. STRATEGY IN THE 
SOUTH CHINA SEA?
Steven Stashwick
China’s extensive island-building projects in the Spratly Islands, the aggressive 
harassment tactics of its maritime law-enforcement and paramilitary fleets, and 
its rejection of binding arbitration rulings on both those activities threaten the 
rules-based international order and pose political, economic, and potentially 
military threats to U�S� interests in the region� In “Getting Serious about Strategy 
in the South China Sea,” from the Winter 2018 Naval War College Review, Hal 
Brands and Zack Cooper make an important contribution to the debate on how 
the United States should respond to China’s challenge in the South China Sea�1 
However, because their argument in favor of finding a new strategy is isolated 
from the identified consequences that such new strategies would have on other 
policies, their analysis falls short of providing a compelling argument for the 
United States to pursue a substantially different South China Sea strategy�
Citing muddled and confused U�S� policies to date, Brands and Cooper sys-
tematically evaluate four broad strategies for a U�S� response, as well as the costs 
and hazards associated with each� Ultimately, they 
advocate combining aspects of two strategies—
containment and offsetting—for implementation� 
However, in their analysis the authors perpetuate 
a tendency among South China Sea analysts to 
restate what makes the region important in isola-
tion, but not to make the case about why it is more 
important than other aspects of the U�S�-China re-
lationship and adjacent regional priorities�2 Doing 
Steven Stashwick is a lieutenant commander in the 
Navy Reserve. He has served in the Pacific Ocean re-
gion throughout his active and reserve careers, both 
afloat and ashore, and at the Pentagon in the Inter-
national Engagement Directorate of the Navy Staff. 
He is a regular author on East Asian defense topics 
and strategy. He earned a BS in systems engineering 
from Virginia Tech and an MA in international rela-
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the latter is necessary to change the incumbent policy hierarchy and defaults� 
If such a reordering is self-evident to proponents of more-assertive policies, it 
demonstrably is not to decision-making authorities, and “Getting Serious” is 
unlikely to change that�
While their analysis admirably defines a universe of strategy options for the 
United States, Brands and Cooper do not provide a systematic way to evaluate the 
trade-offs they identify between the four strategies and other U�S� policy priori-
ties� Without such a framework for comparing the value of a strategy’s expected 
benefits with the expected damage it would impose on other policy priorities, it 
is difficult to evaluate the merits of those trade-offs� The result is that the authors’ 
own strategy-selection criteria appear more subjective than systematic� Neither 
is it clear, in any case, that Brands and Cooper’s recommended hybrid strategy 
would be substantially different in execution from the strategy that emerged 
under President Obama and appears to be consolidating under President Trump�
Brands and Cooper present a compelling list of U�S� strategic interests in 
the South China Sea: the free flow of more than three trillion dollars in trade 
each year; the natural resources that regional states harvest and extract; the 
military-access challenge posed to U�S� forces by China’s island bases in the 
event of an armed conflict; regional stability and what is sometimes called the 
international rules-based order; and, more broadly, regional states’ ultimate 
choice to align and cooperate more with the United States than with China�3 The 
authors implicitly argue that America’s defense of these interests is incoherent 
and confused owing to a lack of systematic thinking about its strategic options, 
the priority objectives it should seek, and acceptable levels of risk in pursuit 
of those objectives� Their subsequent analysis evaluates four strategies for the 
United States: (1) rollback—to dislodge China coercively from its artificial island 
bases, (2) containment—to prevent China’s occupation or reclamation of ad-
ditional geographic features, (3) offset—to match China’s military advances in 
the region with additional military capacity and capabilities of its own, and (4) 
accommodation—to acquiesce deliberately to China’s regional dominance�
However, advocating a change in U�S� South China Sea policy (or any policy) 
requires an affirmative and compelling argument for decision makers to accept 
additional risks to other policy interests in exchange for the expected benefits of a 
new course of action� Unfortunately, while Brands and Cooper consider the nega-
tive impact of each strategy on other U�S� policy priorities, such as armed-conflict 
avoidance, fairness in trade relations, and cooperation on climate change and 
North Korea’s nuclear program, and effects on other regional partners, they do 
not suggest how to place a value on those hazards� As a result, while a reader gains 
insight into why the South China Sea matters on its own terms, it is not clear why, 
or even whether, it matters enough to accept new risks to those other priorities 
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in the U�S�-China relationship or to other regional partner relationships� Today, 
U�S� South China Sea policies already are effectively subordinated to these other 
interests� By not providing an affirmative argument to reorder those strategic 
priorities, Brands and Cooper implicitly endorse the current strategic hierarchy, 
thereby undercutting their assertion that the United States should accept greater 
risk in the region�
Without such a prioritization framework, Brands and Cooper’s recommended 
hybrid containment-offset strategy appears compelling less for its departures 
from existing policies than its similarities� The authors argue that the United 
States should contain China’s ambitions to seize any additional geographic 
features in the South China Sea or to embark on renewed island reclamation� 
However, since containment would not prevent China from reinforcing its exist-
ing South China Sea bases (and might even encourage it), the United States also 
should seek to offset any such military advances with enhancements to its own 
regional military posture� Yet if this approach is intuitively attractive, it is unclear 
how new or substantively different it is from what the United States is pursuing 
already�
Their case for containment rests largely on its demonstrable efficacy in previ-
ous isolated containment efforts the United States has implemented to prevent 
China from occupying or reclaiming additional features in the South China Sea�4 
But if Brands and Cooper’s criticism is that U�S� containment efforts have been 
only episodic, they elide that China’s recent expansion efforts have been similarly 
isolated and episodic� Arguing that U�S� containment now should be more com-
prehensive seems a distinction with little practical difference, as China has not 
occupied or reclaimed successfully any additional features beyond the original 
seven Spratly features it reclaimed and built up after 2013�5
In arguing for the offset component of their recommendation, Brands and 
Cooper do not differentiate meaningfully their version from the global Third 
Offset policy enacted by the Obama Pentagon and the pivot/rebalance to Asia 
to counter, in no small part, rising Chinese capabilities�6 While the Trump ad-
ministration may have abandoned the “offset” name, it does not appear to have 
abandoned the underlying policies or acquisition goals, and its subsequently 
published strategies make commitment to responding to great-power competi-
tion explicit�7 Thus, while Brands and Cooper perhaps have helped clarify the 
terms and vocabulary of debate for a U�S� South China Sea strategy, they seem 
substantively to be advocating for the policy status quo� If U�S� policy has ap-
peared confused or muddled, this is perhaps attributable less to a lack of analytic 
rigor than to issues of execution and the complexity of translating written policy 
into real-world effects�
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Granted, the ultimate choice of strategy rests with U�S� political leadership, as 
do decisions about how to order U�S� policy priorities when they conflict� Brands 
and Cooper recognize this, which perhaps accounts for choosing not to address 
how to order the strategic priorities within the scope of their argument� But if the 
prioritization of one policy area over another is a political choice, it need not be 
a subjective one� Since the publication of their article, the Trump administration 
has published its National Security Strategy (NSS), which signals greater focus 
on China’s strategic competition generally, and singles out the threat of China’s 
island construction in the South China Sea specifically� However, the NSS does 
not assign any specific political or military means for addressing the South China 
Sea, nor does it provide a hierarchy of U�S� interests vis-à-vis China to assist in 
evaluating policy trade-offs�8
As Brands and Cooper assert, the free flow of trade, military access, and the 
rules-based order are important U�S� interests in the South China Sea� However, 
those interests are not generally self-evidently more or less important than other 
aspects of the U�S�-China relationship or other regional interests that would be 
hazarded by a new South China Sea policy� Since the Trump NSS does not pro-
vide an explicit hierarchy of those interests, it privileges the de facto hierarchy 
that deprioritizes the South China Sea today� At the same time, it does not pre-
scribe such a hierarchy by policy guidance, leaving the door open to those who 
might advocate for elevating the South China Sea’s importance� However, without 
demonstrating why preferred strategies will not affect other priorities adversely 
or why South China Sea objectives are sufficiently more important to hazard 
them, Brands and Cooper’s analysis is insufficient to compel such a change in 
South China Sea strategy�
Nonetheless, Brands and Cooper’s preferred hybrid strategy does suggest a re-
search need and a potential policy opportunity� The authors admit that the hybrid 
strategy would not prevent additional militarization on the features China al-
ready occupies� This weakness is mitigated by the offset component, which would 
in theory match—or, rather, offset—any new Chinese capability in the region 
with additional U�S� and partner capabilities� But an offset strategy also effectively 
commits the United States to an arms race with China in a region where the latter 
enjoys advantages of economic ascendancy; geographic proximity; and the ability 
to concentrate forces more easily, given its fewer geographically diffuse security 
demands� The implication is that an offset strategy is more likely than not to ex-
acerbate the security dilemma between the two competitors—a vexing problem 
the authors identify but leave unexplored� This recommends research into policy 
options to halt or limit further militarization of China’s occupied features in the 
Spratly Islands, with a specific objective of preventing either permanent or rota-
tional deployment of the force-projection capabilities those islands by now have 
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 1� Hal Brands and Zack Cooper, “Getting Seri-
ous about Strategy in the South China Sea,” 
Naval War College Review 71, no� 1 (Winter 
2018), pp� 13–32�
 2� Representative of the analytic observation 
that other China and regional issues retain 
the U�S� government’s priority while appeal-
ing for greater attention to the South China 
Sea is Ely Ratner in Andrew Erickson et al�, 
“China’s Menacing Sandcastles in the South 
China Sea,” War on the Rocks, March 2, 2015, 
warontherocks�com/�
 3� Brands and Cooper, “Getting Serious,” pp� 
16–17�
 4� The authors cite successful containment of 
Chinese interference at Second Thomas Shoal 
in 2014 and of an apparent Chinese intent 
to conduct land reclamation at Scarborough 
Shoal in 2016 following high-level U�S� warn-
ings and commitments to the status quo�
 5� Mischief, Cuarteron, Subi, Fiery Cross, 
Gaven, Johnson, and Hughes Reefs in the 
Spratly chain, plus the Paracel group to the 
north, all were occupied by China prior to 
the wave of land reclamation and construc-
tion that began in 2013, meaning none were 
occupied expressly for that purpose� The 
only known subsequent attempt at physical 
been built up to host� Such a policy course most likely would entail a bargain or 
implicit agreement, but—unlike the authors’ accommodation strategy—would 
require maintaining some form of leverage or inducement to ensure compliance�
Such a course falls under a family of policies, such as confidence-building 
measures, crisis-management tools, arms control, and international law and 
institutions, that the United States and other Southeast Asian powers already 
pursue on an ad hoc basis or as supporting policies of the four strategies Brands 
and Cooper evaluate� But instead of considering these as policies intended only to 
mitigate the risks of those broad strategies, their systematic pursuit might consti-
tute a fifth strategy option; call it risk attenuation� Like Brands and Cooper’s hy-
brid strategy, it is largely a defense of the strategic status quo in the South China 
Sea� Such a course would not abandon the role of military balancing and suasion, 
but would privilege the prevention of armed conflict as an affirmative objective�
A risk-attenuation strategy may be criticized as Pollyannaish or naive by ad-
vocates of assertive versions of containment or offset policies, but such a strategy 
recognizes the constraint that those advocates thus far have failed to surmount, 
which is to offer decision makers a compelling argument to change the incum-
bent hierarchy of China policy priorities and accept the additional risk of armed 
conflict that their preferred strategies incur� To that end, a comprehensive com-
parison of those relevant strategic trade-offs is a worthy, if daunting, analytic 
endeavor� However, advocates of stronger South China Sea policies must be pre-
pared that a systematic comparison of those priorities may not yield the compel-
ling justification to change the status quo that they imagine; indeed, it may be 
just as likely to endorse the current policy “muddle” as being appropriate to the 
broader U�S� interests in China and East Asia�
N O T E S
Autumn2018Review.indb   135 8/6/18   8:49 AM
5
Stashwick: “Getting Serious about Strategy in the South China Sea”: What Ana
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
 1 3 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
occupation and reclamation was the case of 
Scarborough Shoal, which the United States 
successfully deterred, as Brands and Cooper 
note� See “Occupation and Island Building—
China” (China Island Tracker), Asia Maritime 
Transparency Initiative, amti�csis�org/�
 6� For an overview of the Third Offset’s goals 
and associated activities, see reporting on re-
marks by Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert 
O� Work and the Vice Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, in Cheryl Pellerin, “Deputy 
Secretary: Third Offset Strategy Bolsters 
America’s Military Deterrence,” DoD News, 
October 31, 2016, www�defense�gov/� On the 
military component of the rebalance to Asia, 
see remarks by the Secretary of Defense in 
Ashton Carter, “Remarks on the Next Phase 
of the U�S� Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific” 
(speech at the McCain Institute, Arizona State 
Univ�, Tempe, AZ, April 6, 2015), available at 
www�defense�gov/�
 7� Offset is no longer explicit Pentagon policy in 
the Trump administration, and some of the 
Pentagon offices associated with it apparently 
have diminished under the Trump adminis-
tration; see, for example, Paul McLeary, “The 
Pentagon’s Third Offset May Be Dead, but No 
One Knows What Comes Next,” FP, Decem-
ber 18, 2017, foreignpolicy�com/� However, 
Trump Secretary of Defense James Mattis 
announced at the beginning of his tenure that 
any focus on capabilities and modernization 
would not come until the Pentagon’s 2019 
budget was in place; see Secretary of Defense, 
memorandum, “Implementation Guidance 
for Budget Directives in the National Security 
Presidential Memorandum on Rebuilding 
the U�S� Armed Forces,” January 31, 2017, 
available at media�defense�gov/� The mod-
ernization priorities that the Pentagon’s 2019 
budget proposal expresses, as well as those of 
combatant commanders and service chiefs, 
suggest that the technologies and capabilities 
that the Third Offset championed, such as 
hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, 
and machine-learning integration, remain 
relevant� See “FY2019 Budget Proposal,” 
Department of Defense, www�defense�gov/� 
Also see, for example, “Statement of Admiral 
Harry B� Harris Jr�, U�S� Navy, Commander, 
U�S� Pacific Command, before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee on U�S� Pacific 
Command Posture, 15 March 2018,” United 
States Senate Committee on Armed Services, 
www�armed-services�senate�gov/�
 8� “National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America,” White House, December 
2017, pp� 2, 46, www�whitehouse�gov/�
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